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Abstract 
Financial markets are complex: Factors that affect their development and the asso-
ciations between these factors are not clearly assignable. Nevertheless, every day 
thousands of investors face the task of mastering the complexity of the markets. 
How do they solve this problem in their daily practice? This paper discusses this 
question by investigating a special area of the capital markets, namely, portfolio 
management. Two possible methods of handling the complexity of financial mar-
kets are presented: first, the qualitative methods (heuristics), and second, the for-
mal (mostly computer-assisted) models. The central finding of the paper is the high 
heterogeneity of the applied methods. There are free spaces that portfolio manag-
ers can use while framing complex market situations. It could be suggested that 
this diversity contributes to the emergence and self-preservation of the market 
complexity. This contribution is dedicated to the empirical argument for these 
mechanisms. 
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1 Introduction: Financial Markets 
Complexity 
This article discusses the phenomenon 
complexity as applied to the case of 
financial markets. Financial markets 
are often used as an example to illus-
trate the assertion that the complexity 
of modern society increased dramati-
cally over last decades. The term com-
plexity is thereby applied as a synonym 
for uncertainty, lack of control, or lack 
of transparency. But what exactly is 
complexity and in what sense are fi-
nancial markets complex? 
Weyer (2009) suggests dividing the 
existing complexity theories into two 
groups: Some theories define complex-
ity as an objective structural phe-
nomenon at the macro level; others 
conceptualize it as a subjective con-
struct. He also points to the fact that 
theories refer to two dimensions of 
complexity: quantitative and qualita-
tive. 
At the macro level, the quantitative 
dimension would mean that the com-
plex phenomenon consists of too 
many components, with too many re-
lations between them; the qualitative 
dimension indicates that specific inter-
actions between components lead to 
unpredictable dynamics. Applied to 
financial markets, this classification 
would suggest that financial markets 
are complex because their behavior is 
determined by several factors that do 
not show clear associations. It could 
be easily demonstrated if one suggests 
that financial market behavior is re-
flected in asset prices. Asset prices and 
their trends depend on a large number 
of factors, whose influence can never 
be estimated with certainty. In the case 
of equities, for example, prices depend 
on the future stream of payments pro-
duced by the company, such as earn-
ings and dividends. They are affected 
by the so-called fundamental factors, 
e.g., profit situation, product range, 
market position, and management 
quality. There are also other factors, 
such as the macroeconomic conditions 
(interest rates, inflation, currency de-
velopments, etc.), political expecta-
tions (tax policies, state subsidies, po-
litical stability, etc.), as well as the psy-
chology of the market players (their 
expectations, risk preferences, etc.). It 
is not just impossible to specify all 
variables; rather, it must always be 
anticipated that new factors are added, 
such as new products, take-over ru-
mors, etc.1 A good example is the un-
expected insolvency of a local bank in 
California in February 2007. The unex-
pected event led to a strong market 
correction. This example also suggests 
that small events can have a big influ-
ence at the macro level. In general, 
complex systems are characterized by 
non-linearity. This means that causes 
and effects are not proportional; there 
are back couplings and interdepend-
encies that lead to emergence of un-
predictable and chaotic2 structures 
(Mainzer 2008, Richter/Rost 2004). 
It is important to point out that finan-
cial markets’ non-linearity and com-
plexity are “man-made”. The develop-
ments of the securities’ prices depend 
on the behavior of several actors and 
their interaction in the market: inves-
tors, analysts, brokers, companies’ 
executives, and investor relations, to 
name a few. The participation of dif-
ferent groups and individuals increases 
the complexity of the system. Those 
groups and persons are carriers of 
individual expectations and experi-
ences that must be taken into consid-
eration along with the investors’ own 
expectations. Every player is observed 
in his or her decision making, while at 
the same time he is an observer him-
                                                       
1 This problem was analyzed by Nassim N. 
Taleb (2007) in his book “The Black Swan: 
The Impact of the Highly Improbable.” He 
called the unexpected factors, that influ-
ence securities prices significantly, the 
black swans. 
2 This is the reason why chaos theory is 
now extensively applied to analyze finan-
cial markets. See Trippi (1994) for an over-
view. 
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self.3 In the case of financial markets, 
Brian Arthur (1995: 3) described this 
problem as follows: “Where forming 
expectations means predicting an ag-
gregate outcome that is formed in part 
from others’ expectations, expectation 
formation can become self-
referential.” This self-referentiality of 
expectations, which determine invest-
ment prices, is one of the most signifi-
cant factors that cause complexity of 
the financial markets. 
In the social world, the intentional 
acting at the level of the individual 
participants often leads to the “condi-
tions that are essentially the by-
products” (Elster 1987: 141). The com-
plex behavior of financial markets is 
not deducible from the actions of the 
individual players and is such a by-
product. This is why complexity is an 
immanent feature of financial markets. 
However, if we follow the Weyer’s 
classification of complexity theories, 
the second group of those theories 
should be mentioned. Representatives 
of this group (Malik 2002; Schimank 
2005) consider complexity as a feature 
of subjective decision situations. Indi-
viduals are limited in their knowledge 
as well as in their cognitive capacity to 
process huge volumes of information 
and to establish causal links between 
many factors. For example, the market 
correction due to the insolvency of the 
Californian bank could not be foreseen 
by most of the market players, since 
they had not been aware of the exis-
tence of this bank and therefore could 
not attribute to the event the signifi-
cance which in the end was attributed 
to it by the market. 
According to Weyer, sociological the-
ory of complexity should consider the 
entanglement of structural and cogni-
                                                       
3 The players are aware of this fact: they 
include observations and expectations of 
outside observers into their own hypothe-
sis and expectations. This increases the 
complexity even further: Luhmann (2002: 
181) suggested using the term hyper-
complexity for this phenomenon. 
tive factors. In the case of socio-
technical systems like aircrafts, for 
example, it is dissatisfactory to restrict 
the analysis to the question of how 
individual cognitive acts are con-
structed. It is important to reconstruct 
the design of the system and the room 
for maneuvering within it (see also 
Grote 2005). 
In this article, I would like to elaborate 
on the link between the structural and 
cognitive factors of complexity in the 
case of financial markets. I will refer to 
the structure or design of the markets 
as the market frame and analyze the 
room for maneuvering that individual 
investors have within those market 
frames. Based on empirical research, it 
can be shown that such room is quite 
significant. This finding suggests that, 
though market frames are socially em-
bedded and shared, there are individ-
ual ways to reduce complexity within 
those frames. In other words, com-
plexity reduction at the micro level is 
itself complex and contributes to the 
complexity emergence at the macro 
level. 
Those topics will be approached in the 
article from an empirical perspective: 
Daily practices of portfolio managers 
as a specific group of financial market 
participants will be analyzed. In sec-
tion 2, the concept of market frame 
will be discussed. In section 3, the 
distinctive characteristics of portfolio 
managers will be described. The cen-
tral question will thus be examining 
exactly how this group of investors is 
exposed to the problem of complexity. 
In section 4, data samples will be pre-
sented. Afterwards, two specific ways 
of dealing with complexity within the 
field of portfolio management will be 
outlined: forming heuristics and the 
use of quantitative models. At the con-
clusion, all findings will be discussed. 
2 Market frames 
Social studies of finance have been 
busy in the last years investigating 
how different groups of financial mar-
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ket participants handle the markets’ 
complexity, i.e., how they decide, if 
there are no “if - then” rules, and if no 
clear effect can be assigned to any of 
the factors. According to those studies, 
there are frames that help to reduce 
complexity while they “reduce the 
amount of possible worlds…, that is, 
reduce contingency” (Arnoldi 2006: 
385). Frames limit decision possibili-
ties, focus and structure the informa-
tion, and help to interpret market 
events while they define boundaries 
for perception, meaning, and commu-
nication. Complexity is reduced 
through framing because a structure of 
possible “if-then” rules emerges. 
As an answer to the question “Who 
constructs the market frame?” Har-
die/MacKenzie (2007) suggest the con-
cept of the “distributed framing”: “By 
this we mean the involvement of mul-
tiple market actors in the process of 
sifting data and constructing ways of 
interpreting it” (Hardie/MacKenzie 
2007: 391). This means that frames are 
formed not entirely individually but in 
the permanent interaction with other 
market participants. There are, for 
example, analysts, brokers, and inves-
tors. They develop practices with 
shared rules, codes, and networks that 
form frames (Knorr Cetina/Bruegger 
2000). It should be added that the state 
also participates in framing processes 
by means of legal regulations. Institu-
tional and organizational design is 
also important. An investor who is a 
member of a big investment bank has 
a frame that differs from the frame of a 
private investor, for example. The first 
one has the opportunity to receive 
support services from analysts and 
brokers or to talk to companies’ man-
agement because he is an official 
member of an investment bank. There 
is also an official funding provided to 
conduct business trips to visit coun-
tries and companies, which means that 
there is the opportunity to talk to in-
vestor relations, companies’ CEOs, as 
well as to state representatives. In 
other words, access is provided to spe-
cial sources of information and thus 
framing possibilities that are inacces-
sible for private investors. There are 
also internal rules and rituals within 
organizations that shape market 
frames of investors (for example, dif-
ferent official meetings). 
It should be also taken into considera-
tion that investment banks employ 
people who enjoyed similar education 
at universities or business schools. 
Institutions also support a specific, 
business-related training of employ-
ees. This leads to the fact that em-
ployed investors share basically the 
same theoretical frames. 
Extensive research has also been con-
ducted on the topic of how diffusion of 
technology and financial formulae 
influence framing devices of the mar-
ket participants (Callon 1998, 
MacKenzie 2001, 2006). In investment 
institutions, high-power computers as 
well as specific technical equipment 
like Bloomberg and Reuters are avail-
able (in addition to the telephone and 
internet). 
Social studies of finance demonstrate 
that there are indeed multiple market 
actors (brokers, analysts, companies’ 
management, investment organiza-
tions, the state, etc.) who participate in 
the distributed framing. Therefore, 
social, institutional, and technological 
conditions are considered to be 
equally important for framing proc-
esses in all types of financial markets: 
in the foreign exchange market, in the 
derivatives market, and in the capital 
market. Studies point to differences 
between the groups of institutional 
market participants: derivatives traders 
(Zaloom 2003, Arnoldi 2006), foreign 
exchange traders (Knorr Cet-
ina/Bruegger 2000), bond traders (Abo-
lafia 1996), arbitrage traders (Be-
unza/Stark 2004), as well as securities 
analysts (Beunza/Garud 2004, Lan-
genohl/Schmidt-Beck 2007). At the 
same time, they concentrate on simi-
larities of framing devices within those 
groups. 
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But if everybody within a particular 
investors’ category is subject to similar 
constraints and uses the same tech-
nology and formulae, one should ask, 
as do Beunza/Stark (2004), “How can 
an investor recognize an opportunity?” 
and “How can he or she profit?”. Re-
lating to our topic, we should ask how 
complexity could be explained in par-
ticular financial markets if participants 
share the frames, i.e., reduce complex-
ity in the same way. In this context, it 
is important to remember that the 
standard financial theory that assumes 
identical investors has difficulties ex-
plaining the complex paths financial 
markets develop, such as bubbles and 
crashes. How do chaotic structures 
emerge within different financial mar-
kets if actors use homogenous frames 
to reduce complexity? 
The concept of the frame is not suffi-
cient to answer those questions. The 
focus should be shifted to the room for 
maneuvering that exists within the 
frames. The paper at hand discusses 
the availability and the structure of 
that flexibility in the case of one addi-
tional group of investor professionals 
that has not previously been the ex-
plicit focus of social studies: portfolio 
managers. Their methods of dealing 
with complexity will be discussed. It 
will be demonstrated that although 
portfolio managers share certain social 
practices, use similar technologies, 
and are subject to organizational and 
institutional constraints, there is still 
flexibility within those frames. The 
suggestion of this paper is to take a 
closer look at flexibility within the 
frames. The hypothesis is that financial 
market participants exploit those free 
spaces in various ways. This means 
that complexity reduction through 
framing does not happen uniformly at 
the micro level. In turn, it is supposed 
that while portfolio managers exploit 
free spaces within their frames, they 
form diverse expectations and make 
different decisions. This heterogeneity 
of expectations and decisions as a re-
sult of complexity reduction contrib-
utes to the increase of complexity in 
the market. This other side of the coin 
– an emergence of complexity, not only 
its reduction – might also be of interest 
for social studies of finance. Complex-
ity is not a given fact that the market 
participants find in the market and 
deal with. Complexity is generated 
while the market participants handle it 
in different ways within their frames. 
3 Portfolio management 
Portfolio managers are financial mar-
ket professionals who invest the mon-
ey of their clients in different assets, 
such as equities, bonds, derivatives 
and other financial instruments, in 
order to earn the maximum return for 
a given risk profile. If the money is 
provided by an individual client, a 
portfolio manager assesses the client’s 
individual needs and exercises alloca-
tion of funds among assets and par-
ticular securities, meaning that the 
money is not invested in a single stock 
or bond but in a group of financial 
instruments, which is called portfolio. 
A portfolio is a diversified mix of secu-
rities. If the money of many investors 
is pooled in a portfolio, such a portfo-
lio is called a mutual fund. In all cases, 
the task of a portfolio manager is to 
decide which and how many securities 
to buy, as well as to watch and to ad-
just the portfolio over the course of 
time. 
The process of portfolio construction 
and adjustment is subject not only to 
clients’ specifications but also to vari-
ous legal, organizational and institu-
tional constraints. First of all, there are 
laws that regulate how portfolios can 
be structured. For example, laws dic-
tate in which securities a portfolio 
manager can invest at all, how to as-
sure a proper level of diversification in 
order to protect investors (for example, 
which percentage of the fund assets is 
allowed to be invested in a single secu-
rity), and so on. Portfolio managers are 
usually employees of investment com-
panies. Investment companies specify 
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the investment products and the in-
vestment processes (investment goals, 
asset classes, reporting period, in-
vestment styles, etc.) as well as define 
how funds’ performances will be 
measured and controlled. For example, 
if a portfolio manager is responsible 
for an Emerging Markets Equity Fund, 
he is allowed to invest only in the eq-
uities of particular emerging countries 
and has to follow a predefined invest-
ment process. Therefore, institutions 
further narrow the operating space of 
portfolio managers and shape their 
frames. 
Still, within those constraints, a port-
folio manager must choose assets that 
will bring the best return for a given 
risk profile. Return is the number that 
relates the final value of an investment 
to its initial value (in percent). The 
amount of money at the end of an in-
vestment period consists of the yield, 
like dividends, coupon or interest rate 
payments, as well as the earnings or 
losses due to price changes of the se-
curity. Those prospective flows of 
payment and movements of the asset 
price in the future are uncertain. To 
compare investment alternatives and 
to construct a portfolio, portfolio man-
agers have to be able to forecast the 
returns of those instruments. At this 
point each portfolio manager faces the 
complexity problem. As discussed 
above, due to many unforeseeable 
factors that influence asset prices and 
companies’ dividends, no reliable rules 
exist to predict returns and thus to 
select investments. 
But is it not a problem that all financial 
market professionals face in their eve-
ryday practices? One question that 
may arise regards the specifics of port-
folio managers as an investor group 
and where we should locate them 
within a broad landscape of social 
studies of finance. Langenohl/Schmidt-
Beck (2007) differentiated two groups 
of investment professionals. The first 
group, which consists predominantly 
of traders, is short-term orientated and 
acts in the close proximity to the mar-
kets; long-term orientated market par-
ticipants, for example, securities ana-
lysts, are not involved in the day-to-
day interaction and are concerned with 
collection and processing of informa-
tion in order to make investment deci-
sions. 
Traders find themselves under pres-
sure to react immediately to the num-
bers that they observe on the screens. 
Those numbers are “interpreted not so 
much as information engendering re-
flection but more as an imperative to 
act – that is, to trade” (Lan-
genohl/Schmidt-Beck 2007: 9). Those 
findings are confirmed by Zaloom 
(2003: 261): “The immediacy of the 
market dictates that attention remains 
on the bid-ask figures that represent 
the position of the market at that sec-
ond…Traders can act with little infor-
mation or understanding of the in-
strument they trade or the economic 
conditions of the countries that issue 
them.” Traders have to rely on the im-
mediate real-time market picture pro-
vided by the comprehensive techno-
logical systems. This means that they 
do not effectively deal with the future 
and are not interested in forecasting. 
The representatives of the second 
group analyze economic and compa-
nies’ data and make forecasts, in order 
to give recommendations (“buy,” 
“sell,” or “hold”), i.e., to communicate 
forecasts to the other market partici-
pants. Analysts do not invest money 
effectively, i.e., they are not exposed to 
the market. Their time horizon aver-
ages to “several months up to one 
year” (Langenohl/Schmidt-Beck 2007: 
11). 
Portfolio managers find themselves 
between those two poles. However, it 
should be mentioned that this investor 
group is not homogenous. By dealing 
with complexity, i.e., by answering the 
question about how to forecast returns 
and how to select securities, portfolio 
managers use basically two method-
ologies: fundamental analysis based 
on processing economic data (compa-
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nies’ financial statements, market po-
sition, quality of management, etc.) 
and quantitative analysis that draws 
on the mathematical and statistical 
approaches to assess market move-
ments. 
Fundamental portfolio managers are 
similar in their approach to securities 
analysts. They not rely only on the 
permanently changing numbers on the 
screen but also collect and analyze 
economic data, perform forecasting, 
and decide to buy, to sell, or to hold. 
However, it is important that they must 
implement their decisions, which 
means that they enter the market with 
a particular amount of money. In this 
sense, portfolio managers are con-
stantly exposed to the markets, like 
traders. 
The frequency of interactions with the 
market depends, however, on the 
strategy that portfolio managers fol-
low. There are on the one hand “buy-
and-hold” investors who take a long-
term view and trade less frequently; 
there are also short term oriented 
portfolio managers. 
Due to the distinctive nature of their 
business, portfolio managers face spe-
cific challenges and develop specific 
solutions while dealing with complex-
ity. Those particularities shall be dis-
cussed now based on the empirical 
research. 
4 Data 
Support for this article is based on 
research that was conducted in several 
German and Swiss asset management 
companies and banks during 2007. 
The data pool of the analysis encom-
passes seventeen guided in-depth in-
terviews with financial market profes-
sionals. The respondents work as port-
folio managers in Frankfurt/Main and 
in Zurich for major international in-
vestment banks (fourteen of the inter-
viewees) and for small investment 
boutiques (two of them). One interview 
was conducted with a financial advisor 
and the owner of an independent in-
vestment company. All respondents 
have more than ten years of experience 
in their field. 
Thirteen interviewees predominantly 
pursue a fundamentally driven invest-
ment strategy. Six of them are respon-
sible for European blue chip portfolios, 
two for European small and mid-caps, 
four for emerging markets, and one for 
investments in bonds. Three inter-
viewed portfolio managers elaborate 
quantitative strategies to allocate as-
sets and to manage funds. 
The duration of the each of the sixteen 
in-depth interviews was about 60 min-
utes. Most of the interviews took place 
in person, and only one was conducted 
by telephone. All interviews were re-
corded and transcribed. The evaluation 
included coding and categorizing (see 
Corbin/Strauss 2008). 
5 Dealing with financial market 
complexity 
The general task of portfolio managers 
while dealing with complexity consists 
in establishing “if-then” rules that en-
able them to forecast asset prices and 
to construct a portfolio. As mentioned 
above, there are two general method-
ologies to do this: fundamental and 
quantitative. We will discuss separately 
how complexity reduction at the level 
of the individual portfolio managers 
takes place in those two ways. This 
happens either by applying heuristics 
(simplified, non-formalized rules of 
data processing) or by utilizing formal 
models. In both cases, it can be shown 
how the “man-made” financial mar-
kets’ complexity is maintained, while 
the market players exploit flexibility 
within their frames. 
5.1 Fundamental portfolio manage-
ment and heuristics 
Decisions of portfolio managers – like 
those of other investor groups - are 
framed. Those frames are not individ-
ual products but are influenced by 
many social factors. Some of them 
 
122 STI Studies 2008:115-130 
 
were already mentioned: there are 
laws, official rules and processes of the 
investment company, educational re-
quirements, and technical equipment 
available within the organization. 
Those are frames in which portfolio 
managers move to reach their goals. 
Within the frames they develop indi-
vidual rules to deal with the market 
complexity, to which the term heuris-
tics could be applied: “The term heu-
ristics relates to rules or strategies of 
data processing, which often lead rap-
idly and at minor costs to a solution 
that is usually reasonably close to the 
best possible result, but does not 
guarantee it: rules of thumb” (Gold-
berg/von Nitzsch 2004: 49). The most 
common simplification rules such as 
mental accounting, anchoring heuris-
tic, and so forth, were described by 
Kahneman and Tversky in the “Pros-
pect Theory” (1979). In the present 
paper, the term heuristics is used to 
designate individual rules and tools for 
dealing with the financial market com-
plexity, which portfolio managers de-
velop and utilize for their own use. 
These rules are based on the individual 
experiences of each market player. 
Fund managers observe the market 
and define for themselves the most 
important factors of influence and 
causalities. Whenever they have to 
make decisions, they rely on these 
same factors of influence and causali-
ties. They also check them continu-
ously and learn from the results (men-
tal back testing). 
The interviews with the portfolio man-
agers showed that these simplification 
rules and tools are quite heterogene-
ous; i.e., handling the financial market 
complexity differs substantially from 
investor to investor and from invest-
ment company to investment com-
pany. Peter Bernstein (1992) reports on 
the experience of Jack Treynor, a fa-
mous financial theoretician of the 20th 
century. Treynor was working at the 
beginning of his career at the founda-
tion of the University of Yale and in the 
1960s visited the most important in-
vestment organizations in the USA: 
“He was astonished by the diversity he 
discovered: No two were doing alike, 
but every one of them thought they 
were doing it the right way. This was 
very perplexing” (Bernstein 1992: 184). 
Exactly the same picture emerged from 
the analysis of the interviews with to-
day’s portfolio managers: They pursue 
the goal to predict future prices of se-
curities and arrive at these predictions 
in completely different ways. 
First of all, portfolio managers have 
room for maneuvering to further limit 
their investment universe and to re-
duce the number of securities and fac-
tors, about which they are constantly 
concerned. This is demonstrated in the 
following interview with a portfolio 
manager in the bond market (Zurich): 
In general, in order to observe my market 
universe, I use the same data for quite 
some time. For example, in the US I look at 
the two-year and the ten-year treasury4. I 
do not look at the five-year and the thirty-
year. I could have done this. It sometimes 
expands a little… the universe, but I try to 
keep everything the same and clearly ar-
ranged. 
Question: And the economic data? How do 
you collect it? 
What I do, I always look at the same data… 
Of course, I have a subjective picture of the 
priority of the data. For me, for example, 
the job market numbers in the USA have a 
high priority. Concerning the inflation… I 
look at the core CPI5 and such things. 
Other people do this a bit differently. Not 
all people are of the opinion that the job 
market numbers are important. With the 
inflation, they look at normal inflation. Or 
with housing6… there I look a little at eve-
rything, and then I look at the leading indi-
cators for housing. Then there are some 
economic data… I do not pay attention to 
them, I notice them, then I look at “over or 
                                                       
4 Government bonds with a maturity of two 
and ten years. 
5 CPI means consumer price index. It is 
used as a measure of inflation. Core CPI is 
a measure of inflation that excludes certain 
volatile items like food and energy prices. 
6 Housing refers to the monthly number of 
new residential construction projects and 
is considered to be a key indicator of eco-
nomic strength. 
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under expectations” but I leave them actu-
ally aside… and… that way I get my pic-
ture. 
This interview excerpt clearly shows 
that this investor pays attention con-
sistently to certain factors, sorts them 
according to their priority in his own 
mind, and is aware of the fact that 
competitors and colleagues consider 
different criteria. 
Portfolio managers also limit the flood 
of information while they carefully 
select the sources of information that 
they use. As mentioned above, avail-
able sources of information such as 
conversations in person or by phone 
with analysts and brokers, company 
meetings and press conferences, and 
meeting with colleagues are elements 
of frames. However, individual inves-
tors attach different importance to 
them, and, in doing so, define their 
heuristics. For example, some equity 
investors believe that regular meetings 
with the corporate management are 
crucial for success, while others regard 
such meetings purely as a waste of 
time; some rely on the corporate earn-
ings guidance, while others ignore 
those and concentrate on the assess-
ments of analysts and brokers, with 
whom they are in touch on a daily ba-
sis, either by phone or email. Some 
investors rely exclusively on external 
databases and services. Differing sig-
nificance is also assigned to the infor-
mation exchange with colleagues. In 
large investment companies, there is a 
meeting each morning, an investment 
meeting each week or month, regular 
meetings or conference calls with the 
buy-side analysts. Those different 
modes of information exchange are 
regarded by the employees of the or-
ganizations either as useful or a waste 
of time. An interview partner (small 
and mid-caps, Frankfurt/Main) from a 
small asset management company 
reported that there are no formal 
meetings within his organization: The 
informal exchange between the col-
leagues takes place only if necessary; 
this allegedly saves a lot of time. 
The received information is also sys-
tematized completely differently. Some 
portfolio managers simply write 
memos. Some use “home-made” tools 
such as Excel spreadsheets that assist 
them to monitor and evaluate the cor-
porate and market data. Which data 
are included in those spreadsheets and 
which key numbers are computed are 
likewise heuristic: Each portfolio man-
ager decides the matter individually, 
relying on his own experience. Thus, 
consensus expectations, expectations 
built by particular analysts, companies’ 
forecasts as well as actual numbers 
already published by companies, and 
the prognoses of the fund managers 
are utilized as input data for the 
spreadsheets. Depending upon the 
individual portfolio manager, calcula-
tions include relative key numbers like 
PE7, cash flow key numbers, growth 
rates, etc. According to one interview 
partner (an independent financial advi-
sor, Frankfurt/Main), even professional 
investors, who apply the same invest-
ment styles (growth or value), calcu-
late different key numbers in their 
spreadsheets. The regularity of up-
dates also depends on the individual 
investor: The spreadsheets are updated 
before or after the meeting with the 
company management, after the publi-
cation of the quarterly reports, after 
ad-hoc news, etc. 
To evaluate the companies and to 
make investment decisions, some fund 
managers use informal, individually 
designed scoring models, in which the 
fundamental quality and valuation of 
an enterprise are given a score. The 
final score is used as a base for an 
investment decision. This approach is 
applied systematically; however, the 
assignment of the scores is not subject 
to any systematization or calculation, 
but rather to a purely subjective judg-
ment. 
Each portfolio manager tries to gener-
ate a picture of the market or of a 
                                                       
7 PE is the relation of the price to the earn-
ings and is used as a valuation tool. 
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company based upon his own individ-
ual rules and tools. These tools must 
be “comfortable” and fit into the man-
ager’s own philosophy. The following 
fund manager’s statement can be con-
sidered as representative: 
With the help of my spreadsheets, I pro-
duce an image of the company in my head: 
whether the firm grows, how it grows - in 
“doubles digits” or “single digits”, organi-
cally or otherwise. For me, such pictures 
are important to determine the trend. This 
is my way of thinking. (Fund manager, 
European emerging markets, Frank-
furt/Main) 
In the interviews, the portfolio manag-
ers often refer to a picture of the mar-
ket or of a company as a puzzle, which 
develops during the course of applying 
the heuristic rules and tools. The het-
erogeneity of the approaches in han-
dling complexity leads necessarily to 
the diversity of these puzzles’ pictures 
and thus to the diversity of the expec-
tations and decisions that are based 
on them. 
However, it seems that diversity of 
individual approaches is desirable for 
investment companies. Beunza/Stark 
(2004: 395) demonstrated in their pa-
per that in the case of arbitrage trad-
ers, the trading room is organized in 
the way that diversity of calculations is 
maintained; uniformity is not wel-
comed. Interviews with portfolio man-
agers show as well that different ap-
proaches are used within the same 
banking house or asset management 
company. Two portfolio managers, 
who are active in the same investment 
company but at different branch of-
fices in Zurich and in Frankfurt, re-
ported on two completely different 
investment processes. In Zurich, the 
process is strongly formalized, it is a 
team- and model-based investment 
process; in Frankfurt, each portfolio 
manager is completely free in design-
ing his own investment strategy. Some 
investment companies knowingly al-
low the heterogeneity of the ap-
proaches. For example, the portfolio 
manager of Jupiter's Global Managed 
Fund, who has nine other managers in 
his team, stated: “I encourage each of 
the managers to do their own thing, to 
run their fund in the way they want to 
run it” (Kelleher 2007: 11). 
Now we have a picture of portfolio 
managers who reduce complexity non-
uniformly. They use available elements 
of their framing devices and combine 
them differently. The tightness of the 
free space is highly determined by the 
organizational rules, but such free 
space always exists. 
This picture is applicable because the 
asset management industry is still a 
highly individual business. It relies on 
the experts, the individual portfolio 
managers, who supposedly earn over 
years a better profit than the market 
average or the competition. The in-
vestment companies rely on the indi-
viduals, “the gold fingers” 
(Döhle/Hetzer/Palan 2002: 154-164). At 
the same time, however, the weak-
nesses of those key players are becom-
ing ever more apparent to the industry: 
Lacking discipline, possessing limited 
capacities in data processing, and de-
pending on emotion jeopardize the 
performance of the active fund manag-
ers. The solution is expected from the 
consistent application of the comput-
erized strategies. 
5.2 Formal Models 
An alternative method to deal with the 
complexity in the market is the use of 
formalized, computer-assisted models. 
The associations between the factors 
of influence and their effects are de-
termined with the help of statistical 
procedures. Computers analyze past 
data and determine which factors, un-
der what type of conditions, were sig-
nificant for the outperformance of cer-
tain securities. These analyses then 
serve to predict what factors will be 
significant in the future. As in the case 
of heuristics, the number of factors to 
be considered is deliberately limited, 
and the associations between those 
factors are ascertained. The computer-
ized strategies of the complexity re-
duction are, however, not based on 
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human experience, but rather on the 
statistic analyses. 
Quantitative models are elements of 
the portfolio managers’ frames. They 
are often relatively similar to each 
other. A portfolio manager (quantita-
tive asset allocation, Zurich) described 
the formalized tools that are used in 
her bank as follows: 
We have valuation… What we naturally 
also have, is momentum, we have senti-
ment and cyclical forces.8 It is exactly alike 
in every other asset management shop. 
One of the reasons for the models’ 
similarity is the fact that the experts, 
who program and use quantitative 
tools, are trained at the universities in 
the same mathematical methods. In 
addition, the successful strategies are 
rather quickly imitated (Gangahar 
2007: 7). Quantitative portfolio man-
agers observe each other’s products 
and adopt and modify some of them. 
One quantitative expert, introducing 
tools developed in his division, used 
the word “steal” several times: “We 
stole this model from this and this 
bank,” and it seems to be a common 
practice. 
Given this tendency, the question 
arises about whether the application of 
the computer models can reduce the 
market complexity to such an extent 
that the markets could no longer be 
maintained. Here we are addressing 
the problem of “computer herding”: If 
the investors judge the market with the 
same or similar formal models, i.e., 
reduce the complexity in the same 
way, they will also have the same or 
similar expectations and make the 
same decisions. This means that all of 
them would favor the same side of the 
market. In other words, they would 
                                                       
                                                      
8 Valuation, momentum, and sentiment are 
techniques to assess securities and mar-
kets. Valuation helps to estimate the mar-
ket value of an asset and to decide if it is 
expensive or cheap. Momentum refers to 
the dynamics of price movements. Senti-
ment indicators gauge investor attitudes 
toward the market. Cyclical forces refer to 
the influence of the general business cycle. 
want only to buy at the same time or 
only to sell at the same time. This 
would cause the other side of the mar-
ket to thin out and threaten the mar-
ket’s existence. 
For example, the implementation of 
similar stop-loss strategies for the 
computer-controlled portfolio insur-
ances was one of the factors that 
caused the stock market crisis in 1987 
(see Authers 2007: 9). In August 2007, 
the unfavorable developments of some 
qualitatively managed hedge funds 
caused similar turbulences in the mar-
ket. A global quantitative equity fund 
of Goldman Sachs lost 30 per cent of 
its value within one week because the 
computers could not foresee some 
market movements and as a result 
implemented a wrong strategy. Many 
other computer-managed investment 
funds experienced the same fate and 
caused the drastic price fall in the mar-
ket (Tett/Gangahar 2007: 7). 
With this in mind, we must raise the 
question of whether complexity is re-
duced in the field of the quantitative 
portfolio management nearly uni-
formly, within the very tight frames. 
Currently, we cannot assert that. Since 
each investment company and each 
portfolio manager still develop their 
own models, the models are not abso-
lutely identical. The diversity is also 
caused by the fact that all preliminary 
modeling decisions are made by hu-
mans. During the process of “crafting” 
the models,9 the experts determine 
individually which data sources are 
utilized, which data are collected and 
processed, as well as how individual 
parameters are modeled. 
In addition, many portfolio managers 
are still convinced of the fact that nu-
merous important parameters are not 
quantifiable. The fund advisor Nils 
Bartram from Hauck & Aufhäuser com-
mented: “There are soft factors, which 
are very important for the future share 
 
9 Several interviewees termed the process 
of modeling as “crafting” the models. 
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development, which you cannot press 
into any Excel tables” (Hussla 2007: 
26). The qualitative factors (the man-
agement quality, the value of a brand, 
corporate governance, etc.) are taken 
into consideration only in the form of 
subjective estimations. This subjectiv-
ity causes inaccuracy. A portfolio man-
ager (European emerging markets, 
Zurich) describes the problems of the 
application of a formal valuation 
model: 
Our funds performed badly in the last year 
because input data for the models are mere 
subjective estimations. During the last 
year, we assessed the growth of the Chi-
nese market too low; accordingly we esti-
mated the oil price at around 33 USD (we 
are maintaining this forecast still10). That 
led to the fact that the macro data, which 
were fed into the model, were wrong; eve-
rything was wrong then. Garbage in - gar-
bage out. That is our central problem with 
models. 
The leeway, which exists when “feed-
ing” the models, leads to heterogene-
ous statements and decisions and pre-
vents a radical complexity reduction in 
the market. 
Flexibility often exists also during the 
implementation of the computer-based 
strategies. The extent of the flexibility 
depends particularly on the policy of 
the investment companies; i.e., an in-
stitution decides again how tight 
frames are. Some insist on the radical 
implementation of the strategies han-
dled by the computers because only in 
this way can the advantages of the 
qualitative investment be completely 
exhausted. 
However, some investment companies 
allow the last decision to be made by 
humans. They permit the fund manag-
ers to bring in their experiences and 
their feelings for the market and to 
implement the models’ recommenda-
tions or not Portfolio managers term 
this procedure a “qualitative overlay.” 
One of them (tactical asset allocation, 
Zurich) describes it as follows: 
                                                       
                                                      
10 March 2007. 
In the end, the whole is, to be honest, a 
qualitative decision. We decide how serious 
we take the valuation signal, for example. 
It is an overlay when we say “OK, the yen 
is, according to the purchasing-power par-
ity model, strongly undervalued, but the 
macroeconomic parameters don’t look 
good…it is unlikely, that the Bank of Japan 
increase the interest rates, and so on.” For 
this reason we don’t take a strong position 
in yen. It is a typical decision. Very qualita-
tive. 
The interviews confirm that creative 
intuition, interpretations, story telling, 
metaphors, and fantasies principally 
supplement formal methods of han-
dling and thus maintaining the com-
plexity in the markets. The portfolio 
managers still do not trust the formal 
methods entirely and use them only as 
supporting tools for their decisions. In 
general, the flexibility in implementing 
the models’ strategies is considered as 
a central condition of their application. 
Here is an example: 
It is important to know, what is going on in 
a company. If a model recommends buying 
a cheap company, I must know why it is 
cheap. For example, Surgut11 is cheap, it 
has been cheap for a long time, but the 
reason for this is known: its management. 
Prosperity fund (a large shareholder) plans 
a management change within the com-
pany. If that finally happens, if the previous 
managers are fired and a new team is 
hired, the Surgut will double, and it will be 
a good deal. Until then it remains uninter-
esting, no matter how cheap it is. (Fund 
manager, European emerging markets, 
Frankfurt/Main) 
The head of the “Quantitative Strate-
gies and Risk Research” department in 
a big investment house in Frank-
furt/Main described three generally 
possible handling of model outcomes: 
We have three basic approaches… First of 
all, we have a strong research supply for all 
fund managers; they can access this re-
search freely and without restrictions, but 
they are not obliged (that’s an important 
point!). Then there is overlay advisory. For 
example, we have a signal… equity market 
or bond market short-long (we keep it 
simple), then we have a portfolio manager 
who has a broad bond fund and who says, 
 
11 Surgutneftegaz is one of the major listed 
oil and gas companies in Russia. 
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“The model which signals short-long is a 
good model.” He receives then an e-mail 
from us whenever we have a new signal 
and implements it 1:1. The next stage is 
that we work with model portfolios. It is 
usually the case when we have an invest-
ment process where we say, “The first step 
is the quantitative approach,” for example 
screening over many equities… we prepare 
the list of hundred most interesting equi-
ties and allocate the model portfolio. In the 
first stage of the investment process there 
is this input, in the second stage the fund 
manager checks, “Does the whole thing 
fit?” … he adjusts the whole thing, makes 
an explicit overlay… We distinguish it in-
ternally: it is a model portfolio if concrete 
weightings are assigned; it is a pure re-
search if it is just a list, a ranking. 
The interview shows that there are 
three ways to handle the results of 
quantitative departments within one 
investment company. The free space of 
portfolio managers depends on the 
product that they manage and on the 
company’s strategy. But if there are no 
clear instructions to use a model, the 
personal opinion about models (“the 
model is a good model”) is crucial. In 
other words, models are a part of 
frames, but they do not always have to 
be used. 
The existence of the qualitative overlay 
suggests that skepticism about the 
usefulness of formal models often pre-
vails. Generally, it is argued: “There are 
many useful areas for investment 
judgment where quantitative models 
never become practicable. In 1996, 
what did investors say would be the 
impact on Hong Kong stock values 
when that British colony reverts to 
mainland China in 1997? There are 
simply not enough cases of very simi-
lar type to do a least-square regression 
of returns versus possible governing 
factors. One may do better by forming 
a subjective judgment, reasoning from 
cases that are similar enough to offer 
analogy, but that are not similar 
enough to use for statistical analysis” 
(Wilcox 1997: 66). In other words, 
there are always new factors added, 
which are not considered in any model 
and which must be programmed af-
terwards. In the interviews, the sub-
prime crisis was mentioned as such a 
factor. A portfolio manager (tactical 
asset allocation, Zurich) reported that 
she just started to integrate this new 
factor into her models in December 
2007, when the crisis was already in 
full swing. She described the inclusion 
of the new factor as a creative process, 
which her competitors perhaps ar-
range similarly, but differently, so that 
their models generate a different out-
put. 
Models prove to be highly imperfect 
instruments for handling complexity 
because they are not capable of cap-
turing all relevant factors and deter-
mining causal relations between them. 
Models cannot supply clear forecasts 
because they cannot sufficiently take 
into consideration the dynamics of the 
relevant factors, particularly their 
changes as well as the emergence of 
new factors. An interview partner 
(bond portfolio manager, Zurich) re-
ported on his experience with an inter-
est rate model: 
Years ago I also created some models: 
regression and factor models and so on. 
Those functioned very well for some time, 
for about two years, but then there were 
shocks. For example, the Asia crisis, the 
Emerging Markets crisis and LTCM12, also 
the Russian default13. In any case, every-
thing went completely wrong. The model 
said six percent, and the interest rate was 
four percent. Previously the difference had 
been in the range of 20-30 basis points; 
thus, it had been correct. Nevertheless, all 
of a sudden, nothing could be done with it. 
In the original format that I had conceptu-
alized, the model was no longer useful. The 
dominant factor in the market became “the 
escape into the quality”; the bonds rose, 
the equity fell due to this one particular 
factor. And this factor was not included 
into the model. If I had taken in my model 
the variable “Emerging Markets Spreads,” 
then it would have functioned very well. 
However, that was originally not included. 
                                                       
12 LTCM: A large hedge fund that put the 
global financial system at risk as a result of 
its collapse in 1998. 
13 Russian default: Financial crisis in Rus-
sia, which led to the suspension of debt 
payment of the Russian state in 1998 
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The relations between the market-
relevant factors cannot clearly be de-
termined for a sufficiently long period. 
As William Strazzullo, the Chief Market 
Strategist at Bell Curve Trading, put it: 
“When they [models] work, it’s good, 
but over time relationships [between 
the factors included in the model] in-
evitably break down” (Gangahar 2007: 
7). Complexity is reduced by the appli-
cation of the models only temporarily 
and rather seemingly. 
Handling the models is an additional 
complexity factor in the financial mar-
ket and represents a fundamental 
problem for all model users. A uniform 
model determining the different mar-
ket parameters does not exist. A port-
folio manager (quantitative asset allo-
cation, Zurich) reported that she runs 
several models simultaneously, in or-
der to compute parameters such as 
momentum or sentiment; each of the 
models, estimating the same parame-
ter, can produce different recommen-
dations. As a result, the problem of the 
model combination develops: How 
does one deal with the different rec-
ommendations of the models that de-
termine the same parameters? Today’s 
market players consider this as a cen-
tral problem: 
This is something where investment man-
agers really differ. Because the tools are 
always the same: a little of DCF14 or, my 
God, do I take the equilibrium interest rate 
or the latest short term … oh, that is trivial: 
we look at it, we know the outcome. The 
question is: How does the model combina-
tion work? And this is what makes the 
shops different (quantitative asset alloca-
tion, Zurich). 
Model combination is a problem, 
which develops the market complexity 
in the process of the quantitative han-
dling. Portfolio managers, who use 
formal computer-assisted methods, 
must judge how they include the quan-
titative parameters in their decision-
making processes, while those pa-
                                                       
14 DCF refers to the Discounted Cash Flow 
model: Valuation tool based on estimated 
future cash Flows. 
rameters are differently determined by 
computers. Hence, they are confronted 
with another complex problem, which 
again can be solved either with the 
help of heuristics (subjective judg-
ment) or with formal methods of 
model combination (model mixing, 
model synthesis, model switching, 
etc.). In other words, the market par-
ticipants treat the problem of the 
model combination, like all other mar-
ket problems, in different ways. This 
guarantees the heterogeneity of expec-
tations and decisions in the market 
and at the same time produces addi-
tional complexity. Financial market 
complexity remains “man-made.” 
In addition, the models themselves 
must be considered as a complexity 
factor. They become a factor of influ-
ence because their interaction, as al-
ready suggested, affects the market. 
Problems like “computer herding” and 
“model combination” give evidence 
that the application of models in-
creases the complexity in the markets 
rather than drastically decreasing it. 
With MacKenzie (2006), it can be as-
sumed here that financial models are 
not “recording equipment” (cameras), 
but also “engines,” which became an 
independent and substantial part of 
the economic processes. Thus, if mod-
els evaluate markets and compute the 
investment strategies, they have to 
include themselves as a factor of influ-
ence in their calculations. However, 
this is what they cannot do, meaning 
that they cannot record and capture 
the total complexity of the markets. 
Their use provokes the diversity of 
decisions and results in an increase of 
the market complexity. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, it has been shown that, 
though the practice of portfolio man-
agers is tightly framed by law, financial 
institutions, education, and techno-
logical tools, there is room for portfo-
lio managers to use those frames in-
dependently and non-uniformly. We 
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demonstrated the flexible use of those 
rooms by discussing both ways of the 
complexity reduction at the individual 
level: heuristics and formal models. 
The application of heuristics, i.e., the 
individual rules and tools of data proc-
essing, leads to the diversity of the 
investors’ approaches. Investors either 
choose which elements of the frame 
(analysts’ reports, management meet-
ings, communication with colleagues) 
they effectively use, or they create their 
own tools like individual spreadsheets 
or scoring models within the given 
frames. Heuristics vary very strongly. 
Though complicated formal tools, 
which are based on the mathematical 
models, show a tendency to standardi-
zation, we also find here significant 
flexibility in their usage. Models are 
not uniformly conceptualized and 
“fed”; their results are often subject to 
interpretation and discussion (“quali-
tative overlay”). The existence of room 
for maneuvering in utilizing formal 
models is considered by market par-
ticipants as a necessary condition for 
the use of models at all. Formal tools 
also produce problems, for example, 
model combination, which requires 
individual creative solutions within 
existing frames. 
In other words, there are heterogene-
ous ways of complexity reduction 
within frames. Financial market com-
plexity is thus not a result of the inter-
play of identical actors with straight-
forward frames that are uniformly 
used. This finding is important because 
it draws attention to the question of 
the complexity emergence. It could be 
suggested that the discovered diversity 
contributes to the emergence and 
maintenance of market complexity at 
the macro level. Financial market 
complexity is caused not just by recip-
rocity of actors who are primitive and 
comprehensible in their way (like 
Brownian particles). There is also 
complexity at the micro level that has 
to be taken into consideration. Atten-
tion should be paid to the question of 
how complexity in the financial mar-
kets is generated, as each individual 
participant tries to reduce it. 
There are already inquiries of this kind 
in the economic theory of complexity. 
Arthur et al. (1996) showed, for exam-
ple, by means of computer simula-
tions, that if we assume heterogeneous 
financial market participants and their 
interdependence and let them adopt 
their beliefs quickly, then “the market 
self-organizes into a complex regime” 
(Arthur et al, 1996: 4). Bubbles and 
crashes occur, and prices show com-
plex statistical features. This mecha-
nism should be explored more closely 
from the sociological point of view. 
Interviews are obviously an insufficient 
tool to deal with this problem. Partici-
pant observations and further methods 
of empirical research are required. But 
this coupling between heterogeneity of 
individual ways of handling complexity 
and the emergence of complexity at 
the macro level should be considered 
as the next step of research. 
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